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3P R E FAC E
As part of its Observatory Program, Istanbul Policy 
Center (IPC), in cooperation with the Transatlantic 
Academy and Columbia Global Centers, organized 
a second conference on the “Future of the Liberal 
Order.”1 The one-day roundtable conference took 
place on May 27, 2014, at Columbia University’s Reid 
Hall facilities in Paris. The purpose of this roundtable, 
like that of the preceding one, was to develop new ideas 
and fresh insight from a small group of international 
participants with a view to contributing to the ongoing 
debates on the shaping of a post-Western world.
Both of these conferences drew upon the work done 
by the Transatlantic Academy over the past two years, 
but they were not confined solely to the issues taken 
up by the Transatlantic Academy fellows. The first 
conference held in Istanbul on May 22-23, 2013, took 
as its point of departure the Transatlantic Academy’s 
2013 report, Transatlantic Disconnect: Citizenship and 
Accountability in the Transatlantic Community.2 The 
questions that arose in that meeting have been incorpo-
rated in the conference report Considering the Future 
of the Liberal Order: Hope, Despair and Anticipation.3
1 See Appendix 
2 Transatlantic Academy, Transatlantic Disconnect: Citizenship and Ac-
countability in the Transatlantic Community (Washington D.C.: Transat-
lantic Academy, 2013). 
3 Ahmet O. Evin, Onur Sazak and Lisa J. Repell, eds., Considering the Future 
of the Liberal Order: Hope, Despair and Anticipation (Istanbul: IPC, 2013). 
This second meeting took as its point of departure the 
Transatlantic Academy’s 2014 report, Liberal Order 
in a Post-Western World. This report acknowledged 
at the outset that the West’s “material and ideo-
logical hegemony” was coming to an end.4 However, it 
concluded that the West would be able to play a signifi-
cant role in promoting liberal values and practices 
and contribute to the shaping of a rules-based world 
in future provided that it has the ability to recover “its 
political and economic strength.”5
The Observatory’s Chatham House roundtable 
format lent itself to the tentative nature of intellectual 
considerations in respect to the perceived changes in 
the global order. One can anticipate a future world on 
the basis of the clues gleaned from current trends; but, 
how the future world might differ from ours remains a 
matter of intellectual speculation.
4 Transatlantic Academy, Liberal Order in a Post-Western World (Washing-
ton D.C.: Transatlantic Academy, 2014), 13.
5 Ibid., 166.
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If the West’s political and economic domination is 
waning, at least in comparison to that of the rising non-
Western powers, what kind of a future world order can 
one anticipate? As the possibility of an alternative order 
arises, to what extent will the liberal order, promoted 
especially by the United States and Great Britain, 
remain a viable and valid source for maintaining global 
order? Or, in the transition from Western hegemony to 
emerging powers, will there be a different rules-based 
system developed for global governance?
The debate began with a sobering note as one scholar 
asserted that attempts at establishing dialogue with 
emerging powers had failed to take root because of the 
divergent interests and priorities among the emerging 
powers. The emerging powers on the whole rejected 
the “old order” and were often determined to play by 
their own rules. Hence, the traditional tools that have 
been in use in multilateral diplomacy and international 
relations no longer served effectively as a means for 
communication or mediation. New tools were needed 
to address the problems brought on by both current 
global events as well as ever-changing geopolitics. 
These new tools must also ensure a common under-
standing (not necessarily agreement) of issues between 
the West and the Rest. 
In light of recent global developments, the future of the 
liberal order in both emerging countries and the West 
looks bleak. Events across Europe and the Middle East 
are of increasing concern as they demonstrate how 
far the world has veered away from the rules-based 
ideology of the liberal order. The recent European 
Parliamentary elections that reflect the rise of Euro-
skepticism and nationalism, the crisis in Ukraine, 
Russia’s increasing belligerence, the prevalence of 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, and above all, 
the spread of jihadist terrorism across the Levant—they 
have all run counterintuitive to the rationale behind 
the international liberal order and contributed to the 
increasing anxiety about the world’s uncertain future. 
These events, moreover, call into question whether 
or not it will be possible to maintain an international 
order that will serve as an agreed norm of reference 
in the same way the liberal order has served in the 
course of modern history. Economic and political 
uncertainty in the West has given rise to doubts about 
time-honored assumptions concerning the integrity of 
the nation state, its moral function, and its interactions 
with other nation states, international organizations 
and supranational institutions, civil society, and the 
“world community” at large. 
The May 2014 European Parliamentary elections saw 
the rise of conservative, right wing, and Euroskeptic 
political parties. The particularistic, ideological 
rhetoric emanating from these parties is also in sharp 
contrast to the internationalist, rules-based outlook 
that characterizes the liberal order. The financial crisis 
that has been felt by countries around the world is still 
taking its toll in most European countries, including 
Spain and Greece. Meanwhile, tensions in Ukraine 
have been rising since the annexation of Crimea, and a 
proxy war is being fought in Eastern Ukraine between 
the Ukrainian army and the self-declared secession-
ists. Russia’s assertion of military and economic force 
to subdue and control its “near abroad” has been 
implemented with no restraints to the extent of arming 
irregulars with sophisticated missiles, which resulted 
in the loss of a civilian aircraft with its international 
passengers. Although Russia’s excesses in intimidating 
Ukraine have drawn sharp rebuke, including sanctions 
by the United States and the EU, the West’s response 
to Russian aggression has nevertheless been criticized 
as weak and ineffective. Russia’s ability to carry out its 
policies militarily and without restraint in its neighbor-
hood points clearly to the weakness, if not the absence, 
of an international order at the present time. 
Disorder has also spread across the Middle East, where 
debilitating armed conflicts mirror intense polariza-
tion along ethnic, confessional, and communitarian 
lines. Iraq is a vivid example of how violently central-
ized forces operate in a divided land. The civil war in 
Syria continues to rage with no likely end in sight, 
especially after recent elections yet again have ensured 
Al-Assad another term as president. The rise of inter-
national terrorist organizations such as the Islamic 
State (IS) in Iraq and Syria and their ability to spread 
out and control large areas in both the Middle East and 
sub-Saharan Africa have been unanticipated, serious 
developments. IS gained power from Sunni radicals, 
such as al-Nusra, at first inadvertently supported by 
the West along with other opponents of the Assad 
regime, and from members of Saddam’s army that was 
demobilized and thus driven underground by the Bush 
administration. 
5On the one hand, the West has been blamed for standing 
by despite human rights violations and evidence of 
chemical weapons use in Syria. As such, Obama’s “red 
line” had been crossed, and the West had failed to act 
in a determined fashion, charged some observers, 
in the face of the biggest humanitarian crisis of the 
twenty-first century. Yet, the West woke up to a greater 
humanitarian crisis as well as a bloodier upheaval 
caused by the IS.
On the other hand, as some observers have continued 
to insist, it was the authoritarian regimes that were the 
main cause of the region’s instability. These regimes, 
such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and other Gulf states, 
have continued to hold sway in other parts of the Middle 
East and have escaped virulent criticism. Meanwhile, 
Egypt’s military coup, with support from the West as 
some observers claimed, attracted much attention and 
condemnation of those who had pinned their hopes on 
the “Arab Spring” as a popular movement that would 
harbinger democratic awakening in the MENA region. 
It is true that the general behind the coup, Abdel Fattah 
al-Sisi, was elected president in May 2014 despite an 
extremely low voter turnout and a last-minute 24-hour 
extension of the elections. However, it must be asked 
if the Morsi government had been dedicated to demo-
cratic principles and if the Morsi regime would have 
steered Egypt any closer to the Western concept of 
pluralist order. 
This past year has proved to be challenging not only 
for Europe and the Middle East but also for those in 
Turkey who were forced to reflect on the relationship 
between economic growth and democracy. The Gezi 
Protests, which brought thousands of protestors to the 
streets in many cities in the summer of 2013, could be 
interpreted as a reaction against the uneven economic 
growth of the country that resulted from pursuing rents 
from land development. Clientalistic policies of the 
government resulted in a real estate boom driven by 
companies supporting the AKP. Construction in many 
sites continues despite court orders to the contrary, 
which remains to be a source of frustration across the 
country.
The Gezi Protests forced Turkish society to reflect 
on the discrepancy between economic growth, on the 
one hand, and democracy and equality on the other. 
Turkish politics took another blow on December 17, 
2013, when several cabinet ministers, officials, and the 
Prime Minister’s son were accused of graft allegations, 
and the Prime Minister himself was implicated in the 
scheme. A series of tape recordings was released of 
several ministers caught in the act, which validated 
long-held suspicions of corruption in the top tier of 
the Turkish government. In an attempt to clear his 
name from graft allegations, Erdoğan has managed to 
bypass the judicial system by reassigning prosecutors, 
reshuffling the judiciary, and restacking his cabinet. 
Throughout the crisis and since then, he has increas-
ingly resorted to authoritarian tactics and polemical 
rhetoric, resulting in greater polarization in Turkey. He 
has used executive power over the judiciary to incrimi-
nate the Gulenists, the AKP’s erstwhile supporters, 
and oust them from the judiciary and bureaucracy. 
His uncontrolled rhetorical excesses went so far as 
to offend Turkey’s allies, notably the United States. 
Nevertheless, the AKP has been given credit both by 
its supporters as well as its critics for transforming 
the Turkish economy and achieving high growth rates, 
which, ironically, also resulted in the uneven distribu-
tion of resources in society. Yet, economic growth and 
expectations from that growth have led to the AKP’s 
victory in the March 2014 municipal elections, winning 
43 percent of the vote. Erdoğan campaigned personally 
emphasizing national issues and thus turned these 
local elections into a referendum of personal approval. 
Repeated workplace accidents in both the mining and 
the construction sectors reveal how little attention was 
paid to the safety of blue-collar workers. In May 2014, 
the Soma mining disaster resulted in the death of 301 
miners due to neglect and failure to implement neces-
sary security measures. The same, it was pointed out, 
was also true in the construction sector, where frequent 
workplace accidents have caused hundreds of deaths 
in recent years. Both cases, it was argued, reflect how 
much political support was given to investors, regard-
less of their lack of concern with safety, as a result of 
the AKP’s “neoliberal” policies. These cases also call 
into question the degree to which the AKP’s so-called 
neoliberal policies are consistent with the interna-
tional world order. In the event, the Soma disaster did 
not detract from Erdoğan’s popularity; again, he won 
the presidential election in August with a little over 50 
percent of the vote.
6T H E  L I B E R A L  O R D E R  I N  P E R I L :  
F U T U R E  O F  T H E  W O R L D  O R D E R  A G A I N S T  T H E  D E C L I N E  O F  T H E  W E S T
R EC O NS I D E R I N G  O U R  C O N C E P T UA L  F R A M EWO R K
The West, mainly the United States and the UK, has 
been perceived as the main anchor of the international 
liberal world order for the past two hundred years. 
This liberal order, the one that is currently in question, 
consists of both democratic and economic governance 
built around clearly articulated rules-based norms 
and principles. While Great Britain was the champion 
of the liberal order prior to World War II, the United 
States took the lead after the war in an effort to spread 
“liberal democracy, industrial capitalism, secular 
nationalism, and open trade. In order to defend and 
expand democracy, the rule of law, and free markets, 
the United States and its Western allies institutional-
ized this liberal, multilateral order, and then worked 
hard to extend the reach of Western institutions once 
the Cold War ended.”6 
In light of the recent global events and their impact, the 
general assumptions underlying the basic framework 
of the liberal world order have become vague. The rela-
tion of the liberal order to democracy has been called 
into question as emerging countries tend to exhibit 
authoritarian tendencies, yet they are able to benefit 
economically from the rules-based liberal world order. 
This apparent paradox reflects how the political and 
economic aspects of the liberal order, once thought to 
be inseparable from one another, can indeed be taken 
and adopted separately by those countries that did 
not experience the development of the modern state 
in the same way as Western Europe did. If these two 
dimensions of the liberal order can be taken à la carte 
and adopted selectively, as for example by the so-called 
“illiberal” democracies, then it becomes essential to 
redefine and develop a new concept of the liberal order. 
However, in redefining the liberal order, according 
to the current realities of the international system, 
care should be taken to avoid entrapment by received 
notions. Is the liberal order in danger? This central 
question was discussed by one participant who claimed 
that the so-called liberal order had never been widely 
and uniformly adopted, nor was it “orderly” or “liberal.” 
Another participant chimed in to remind the group that 
the Western international order itself had been hardly 
liberal during most of the twentieth century. Further-
more, the Transatlantic Academy’s 2014 report clearly 
stated that it was not correct to “envisage this emerging 
debate as entailing a clash between the West and the 
6 Henry Kissinger, World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and 
the Course of History (London: Allen Lane, 2014), 282. 
‘Rising Rest.’”7 Glossing over the differences between 
nation states and defining them within two categories 
as “the West” and “the Rest” does not correctly reflect 
the dynamics of international relations today. 
Classifying the West and the Rest, it was pointed out, as 
distinct camps was erroneous as was taking the West to 
be a monolithic entity. Likewise, it was an error to state 
that the West or Europe, for example, was in financial 
decline. Many countries in Europe were doing well 
economically, especially those beyond the Eurozone. 
Moreover, the striking differences between American 
and European normative values was another factor 
that belied the notion of a coherent West. European 
norms generally included a social market economy 
that restrained neoliberal excesses and higher social 
benefits to the citizens; but, did they also overly expand 
the role of the state, as some claimed, and hinder 
economic growth? Whether Europe, the largest trading 
bloc in the world, needed radical reform in order to be 
able to promulgate the liberal order was a question 
worth pursuing. Furthermore, normative differences 
that have arisen as a resource of new emerging powers, 
which have a colonial history and unique narratives 
of their own, have further complicated the question 
of whether the liberal order will survive in “the next 
world,” to borrow Charles Kupchan’s apt phrase.8 
It was suggested that the Western order rested on two 
pillars. The first pillar contained the “undignified” 
needs or the economic aspect of the Western model 
that embodied competition, open markets, and free 
trade. The second pillar referred to democracy and 
its values, including the rule of law and human rights. 
The framework suggested that there was indeed some 
use in distinguishing between the West and the “rise 
of the Rest.” While “the Rest” seemed to question the 
legitimacy of the democratic second pillar, the West 
seemed to be reassessing the relevance of the first pillar. 
The emerging powers had adopted and enormously 
benefited from open markets and free trade. Economic 
freedom did not seem to be in danger among emerging 
powers; however, the recent economic crisis, which 
erupted with huge political reverberations in the West, 
had cast doubt on the liberal order’s economic model. 
7 Transatlantic, Liberal Order in the Post-Western World, 7. 
8 Charles Kupchan, No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Com-
ing Global Turn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 186-187. 
7While the West, particularly Europe, has become less 
convinced of the economic model it promoted in the 
first place, the emerging powers, as noted, have largely 
ignored democracy in embracing the economic pillar 
of its liberal order. For the West, the two pillars cannot 
be separated. The liberal order, the West claims, cannot 
survive for long without investing in both pillars. That 
is why liberal democracies criticize the Rest for their 
illiberal regimes and democratic deficit. Interdepend-
ence between the two pillars was emphasized in a 
succinct definition proposed: “The first pillar is output 
legitimacy whereas the second one is input legitimacy.”9 
Hence, in order to keep a society stable, there must 
be a balance between the two pillars. However, it was 
posited that the West had failed to achieve such a 
balance because of poor leadership. The situation in 
the United States was even bleaker given the gridlock in 
the political system, as evidenced by the October 2013 
government shutdown, and the absence of bipartisan 
cooperation on major national issues. Ideological coop-
eration between Democrats (liberals) and Republicans 
(conservatives) often threatened to cause immobiliza-
tion in the U.S. governmental system. With respect to 
the United States, moreover, it was posited that Amer-
ican culture reinforced individualism to such a great 
extent that it became impossible to expect voluntary 
restraints on the part of individuals to conform to any 
restrictions, even security restrictions. The NSA leaks 
(and the heightened security measures that resulted 
from those leaks) constituted but one example where 
unqualified support for individuals became in the final 
analysis a self-defeating proposition. Emphasis on 
security to curb individualistic excess, it was stated, had 
ironically resulted in American illiberalism, bringing 
the United States closer to the authoritarianism of the 
rising powers.
9 See, Vivien Schmidt, “Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union: 
Input, Output and ‘Throughput’,” KFG Working Paper Series, no. 21 (No-
vember 2010), Freie Universität: Berlin.
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It is often asserted that the West has been in decline, 
but ultimately, such assertions are vague. What needs 
to be clarified is what it is that is in decline. Is it the 
Western model itself, or is it the Western powers that 
are in decline? How can this envisaged decline be 
measured? Another question asked in this regard was 
what were the consequences of the steady decline 
of the West’s share of the global GDP. In addition, it 
was asked, could the ratio of military expenditure to 
GDP be taken as an accurate indicator of strength or 
decline? It was pointed out that while the United States 
was still spending considerable amounts on its military 
so also were countries such as Saudi Arabia, China, and 
Turkey. However, the decline of a particular power, no 
matter how important, ought not to be compared with 
the decline of the bloc or the model itself. For example, 
with the ratio of its military expenditures to its GDP 
well below that of the United States and many of the 
emerging countries (such as the latter three), can it 
be said that Germany was in decline even while it is 
Europe’s most powerful economy and its exports have 
exceeded those of China in the previous two years? 
Whether military spending is an accurate indicator of 
the decline of the liberal order in the West remains a 
moot point, but by all accounts, the West still remains 
financially stronger than the Rest. Data such as GDP 
and military spending are not accurate measurements 
of power nor can they be used for assessing the effec-
tiveness or decline of the model itself.
In differentiating between the decline of the model 
and the decline of the powers, it was observed that 
the Western liberal model could not possibly be in 
decline; in fact, the United States demonstrated signs 
of entering a cycle of rejuvenation. Moreover, one 
participant further went on to argue that the liberal 
order, which was promulgated by the United States 
after World War II, was too strong to fail. However, the 
increasing gap between the economics of Northern and 
Southern Europe may point to difficulties in respect to 
the effectiveness of the liberal order. If the economic 
discrepancy between the two regions were to grow 
even wider, the economic principles of the liberal order 
would be called into question. Yet, if there was an alter-
native economic model to replace free market capi-
talism, it would have been identified during the global 
economic crisis. One participant stated that it was 
ultimately not a question of whether or not the liberal 
order’s economic model would ever collapse—instead 
it was whether or not it would be corrupted and when. 
A contrary argument was that the future of the liberal 
order was being threatened from within. Accordingly, 
the greatest threat to the liberal order did not come from 
outside the West but rather lay in the West’s inability to 
practice good governance at home. This self-criticism 
marked a change in the West’s typical narrative, which 
had habitually focused on external threats to the liberal 
order and vilified “the rise of the Rest.” In respect to 
the decline of the liberal order, reference was made to 
the Transatlantic Academy’s 2013 report, Democratic 
Deficit, which asserts that Western liberal democracy 
as a whole is in a state of decline.10 Democracy in the 
West, this strand of argument ran, was strained, and 
there was disconnect between governments and their 
citizens on every level. High levels of political mobi-
lization were seen to have resulted from the current 
democratic disconnect. Political parties, too, took their 
share of blame for the erosion of Western values. Even if 
political parties alternated at the helm in democracies, 
there were no meaningful changes made in policies. In 
other words, while there were new faces, the rules of the 
game did not seem to change, and in this way, there was 
danger that money and politics became intertwined, 
resulting in discouraging or dissuading citizens from 
participating in politics. In order to motivate people to 
participate in politics and thereby address democratic 
disconnect, it was critical to rethink the relationship 
between society, state, and economy.
10 Transatlantic Academy, Democratic Disconnect. 
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Among a variety of opinions with respect to the future 
of the liberal order, one dominant view is that the 
liberal order in the future will be less American and less 
liberal. In his article “Internationalism after America,” 
John Ikenberry has stated, “Not only is the United 
States’ preeminence passing away, they say, but too, is 
the open and rules-based international order that the 
country has championed since the 1940s.”11 Ikenberry 
holds firm to the position that the essential concerns of 
the liberal order will remain valid; however, the West, 
he claims, must quickly modify the way in which the 
liberal order functions instructionally in order to face 
today’s and tomorrow’s challenges.
Others, however, are not so sanguine about the 
continued relevance of the liberal world order and 
argue instead that other powers, notably China, would 
present a different model (the Beijing model) and lead 
the way internationally. Even if China challenged the 
liberal order, it was observed, it nevertheless did not 
pose a threat to the international liberal order; it was 
unlikely that China would attempt to take on the U.S. 
role as the hegemon behind the liberal order. There 
was no argument, however, with respect to the reasons 
why China would not become a hegemon. The 2014 
Transatlantic Academy’s report called for greater 
understanding of emerging countries in the interna-
tional arena, echoing John Ikenberry’s earlier state-
ment, “Brazil, China, India, and other fast-emerging 
states have a different set of culture, political, and 
economic experiences, and they see the world through 
their anti-imperial and anti-colonial pasts.”12 While 
these countries are relatively new to the scene, they are 
not necessarily faced with the same kind of problems 
that challenged the Western countries. 
It was claimed that 2014 would be the year in which 
Chinese leaders would mark the end of Western tute-
lage over China. Although China and Europe had a 
long history, evidence of new prejudices against China 
had made Chinese leadership uneasy and suspicious, 
yet they were still open to having a meaningful and 
constructive dialogue with the West. The West, in turn, 
needed to be careful not to create rhetorical, cultural 
misunderstandings in the course of its dialogue with 
China; it has to be particularly cautious with the 
language. For instance, while most of the Western 
11 John Ikenberry, “The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism 
After America,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 56-68. 
12 Ibid.
narrative is centered around the “rise” of China, most 
Chinese do not view China’s emerging economic and 
political power as a “rise” but as a “restoration” to a 
time when China was a prominent power in the global 
economy. Because of misunderstandings such as this, 
China reacts to what it sees as a blatant misconcep-
tion of Chinese history; the West, in turn, interprets 
the Chinese reaction as an indicator of China’s aim 
to become the leading hegemon. However, this is not 
the case. Contrary to popular belief, it was argued 
that China did not see itself as ethically or morally 
competent to be able to take on such responsibility. 
Moreover, China did not see its place in the future as 
being insecure; it has never attempted to rule the world 
before, and it would be unlikely that it would try to 
do so now. The West needs to accommodate Eastern 
cultural perspectives, such as the example given, in 
order to respond to China meaningfully in the context 
of a dialogue. 
China’s outlook on the world has been significantly 
different from that of the West. China, like several 
other non-Western cultures, sees the world as being 
segmental; processes, procedures, laws, even concepts 
could be considered in terms of their constituent 
parts, allowing for selective borrowing of, for example, 
the liberal order. In the Middle East as well as East 
Asia, didn’t modernization mean, after all, selective 
borrowing from Europe?
In addition, other emerging countries, such as the 
BRICs and now the MINTs that were able to benefit 
from the free market system of the liberal world order, 
seem to be cherry picking from among the other aspects 
of the liberal world order. The question then becomes 
the following: to what extent do these other emerging 
markets buy into the two pillars of the international 
liberal order? Are they planning to devise their own 
system? In response to these questions, two opposing 
interpretations emerged with respect to the intentions 
of “the Rest.” The discourse surrounding Russia’s role 
in Ukraine was a case in point. 
One view was that Russia had indeed cherry picked 
from the existing world order in implementing 
its policies in Ukraine, and therefore, it had not 
completely “bought into” the values of democracy 
that are inherent in the second pillar. Due to the new 
geopolitical challenges that Russia’s interventions in 
Ukraine and Crimea gave rise to, it was likely that the 
security and energy dimensions of Europe’s reaction to 
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Russia would be affected. It was then the responsibility 
of other countries to come up with new tools in order 
to deal with a more convoluted multilateral relation-
ship among a range of international protagonists. This 
interpretation implied that Russia’s unilateral inter-
vention resulted in nothing more than simply a glitch 
in the existing world order and that the West simply 
needed to readjust itself in order to be able to continue 
its spread of democratic values. The opposite view was 
that there already existed an alternative world order. 
Russia’s impunity towards its “near abroad,” especially 
developments in Ukraine, pointed to the existence of 
a rival order to the familiar liberal order, the effects of 
which were already being felt. However, we have not 
had a chance to adequately observe this rival order to 
be able to discern its characteristics.
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P R O P O S A L S  A N D  C O NS I D E R AT I O NS :  O L D  TO O L S  TO  FAC E  N EW  P R O B L E M S
It was agreed that the tools of multilateralism that 
have been commonly deployed in foreign policy and 
international relations needed to change in order to 
meet the challenges posed by the new geopolitics. This 
required action in the following three categories: (i) 
addressing the economic and material decline of the 
West; (ii) launching a meaningful dialogue between the 
West and the emerging powers; and (iii) changing our 
preconceived notions of leadership in an international 
world order. 
In the face of what was called the obvious material 
decline of the West, it was proposed to focus on 
economic factors, such as accelerating trade liberaliza-
tion in order to be able to revitalize the Western part 
of the global economy, to ensure a better defense for 
the United States and Europe together, and to make 
room for emerging powers to take their place in the 
global share of the economy. These actions needed 
to be taken not only in order to prevent the West’s 
economic decline but also to uphold the moral appeal 
to the system. 
In attempting to establish a dialogue to tackle the issue 
of using old tools to deal with new problems, the West 
needed to be able to identify with a narrative of its own 
in the first place. The fact that Europe did not have a 
common narrative with which it could readily identify 
was a permanent problem. The European narrative 
of peace, growth, and universal values that had been 
relevant for the first and second generations after the 
European Community was established had lost its 
relevance. The transatlantic narrative, too, had evapo-
rated in the wake of the special relationship between 
the United States and the UK. 
The importance of establishing a fresh dialogue 
between the West and the Rest was reemphasized. In 
order to avoid misunderstanding and misconceptions, 
there was a need to develop a common rhetoric, taking 
into consideration the differing cultural, social, and 
historical backgrounds of emerging countries. What 
did “civil society” mean in different cultural contexts? 
How differently was it perceived across cultures? In 
which ways did individualism and collectivism differ 
among various cultural contexts? Also, changes in the 
social structure of urbanizing societies often resulted 
in a mix of collectivism and individualism within the 
same country. It was important to understand how 
those notions were manifested in everyday life and how 
two different cultural assumptions might clash. On the 
other hand, an exclusive emphasis on language ought 
not be permitted to obfuscate important issues. The 
purpose of the dialogue was to reach a common under-
standing with a view to providing practical solutions. 
Establishing such a dialogue with China would be the 
key initiative in this regard. 
Finally, our assumption that there is a single hegemon 
leading the international order had to be called into 
question. Just because the United States has acted as 
the leading hegemon behind the liberal world order 
since World War II did not mean that it will have to be 
replaced by another single hegemon or that we should 
embark on a search for a new one. The consensus was 
that China would not replace the United States as the 
guarding hegemon of the international order. Never-
theless, let the West beware: if it wants to preserve its 
values, it must be cognizant of the fact that a single 
power can no longer dominate the system but instead 
can only be the prevalent party. 
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